The Future of Municipal Trading Services: Towards Self-Sufficient Utilities

Future Cities Africa and the Municipal Edge present the 5th Annual "Local Government Conversations" Webinar Series.

5th Annual Local Government Conversations - Webinar 8 of 2026

The Future of Municipal Trading Services: Towards Self-Sufficient Utilities

Hosted by: Future Cities Africa and The Municipal Edge

Platinum sponsor: Business Engineering
Gold sponsor: Ntiyiso

Date: 11 November 2026

Topics: Metro Trading Services Reform - Ring-Fenced Utilities - Single Point of Management Accountability - Revenue Recovery - Financial Modeling - Institutional Restructuring - Cost of Supply - Data Integrity - Non-Revenue Water and Electricity

This webinar marked the last in the 2026 Annual Local Government Conversations series - held the week after South Africa's local government elections. It brought together a metro electricity manager, a metropolitan CFO, a revenue consulting specialist and an asset management expert to unpack National Treasury's metro trading services reform program: what it asks, what it requires structurally, and what early implementation in eThekwini and Mangaung has revealed about the scale of the challenge and the opportunity.


The reform in brief

National Treasury's Metro Trading Services Reform sits under Operation Vulindlela Phase 2 and targets the eight metros, which together contribute more than 50% of GDP but are largely failing. The reform focuses on electricity, water and sanitation, and solid waste - consumption-based services that should generate enough revenue to sustain themselves. A new Urban Development Financing Grant provides R54 billion to the eight metros, backed by a World Bank loan, with a performance-based release mechanism: no delivery, no funding. Metros that meet reform commitments are expected to unlock a matching R54 billion of their own, taking total infrastructure investment potential to R108 billion. After 2032, Treasury may regulate the reforms to apply beyond metros to all municipalities.


Speaker contributions

Mr Subash Jagannath - Senior Manager: Communication Networks Technical Support Division, Electricity and Energy Directorate, eThekwini Municipality

Subash laid out the diagnostic behind the reform, explained the seven-box model and eight minimum commitments that govern grant access, and walked through eThekwini Electricity's financial modeling exercise - the first time the metro had a clear picture of its true losses and the levers available to reverse them.

  • The root problem is a negative reinforcing loop: declining services cut cash revenue, which leaves less money for maintenance and investment, which causes further infrastructure decline. Treasury identified roughly R25 billion in inefficiencies across metros. This loop is caused by split accountability - technical functions sitting in the trading service directorate, with billing, HR, procurement and ICT in separate corporate departments under generic city rules, with no one owning the cash flow or cost coverage end-to-end.
  • The seven-box model addresses this: one accountable manager - the SPOMA (Single Point of Management Accountability) - with delegations to manage the trading service as a business. Four outcome boxes (customer services, sound finances, asset operations, asset investment) rest on capable people and systems, supported by sound governance. Council acts as the service authority and holds management to account; a service compact defines the relationship between the two.
  • The eight minimum commitments are grant entry criteria: service compact; appointment of a SPOMA; fit-for-purpose organisational structure; delegations of authority; a business and investment plan informed by financial modeling; budget support from council; separate annual financial statements including cash flow statements; and change capacity. eThekwini completed all eight for Cohort One (electricity and water and sanitation) by June 2026 and is currently under independent verification for its 2026/27 grant allocation.
  • Financial modeling revealed that eThekwini's electricity losses are closer to 25% - not the 11-12% previously reported based on estimated sales. That gap represents nearly R3 billion in billed revenue on energy already purchased. Only 47% of prepaid meters were active; 51% of commercial and industrial customers were receiving accurate metering and billing; R166 gigawatt hours of street lighting was unbilled; and R1.9 billion in capital was locked in work in progress requiring a further R2 billion to complete.
  • The model shows a pathway from a R2 billion deficit in 2024/25 to a projected R1.6 billion surplus by the end of the reform program - by recovering revenue on energy already bought, removing city charges, completing work in progress, and deploying smart metering. These are modeled outcomes, not yet achieved. Each finding is a lever: recovered revenue funds maintenance; reliable services keep customers paying.
  • Institutional restructuring has moved eThekwini Electricity from an asset-class structure to a value chain structure - divisions for network planning and construction, network operations and maintenance, sustainable energy and retail operations, and shared services and finance. A director has been appointed as SPOMA. The same has been done for the other two trading services.
  • With new councils now in place after the elections, governance must take centre stage. Councillors must understand their role as a service authority - setting policy and holding the SPOMA to account, not managing operations. Governance must stay separate from management. Performance-based grants are an effective motivator: Treasury's active involvement aligned eThekwini's structures and plans with the reform requirements.

"Reform did not create these problems. It ultimately revealed their true scale. Metering, revenue, capital, and maintenance are one system. Fixing one alone changes little."

Ms Zuziwe Thekisho - Chief Financial Officer, Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality

Zuziwe described Mangaung's implementation choices - including opting for the business unit model rather than a municipal entity - and was candid about the financial reality the reform has exposed, including that water and sanitation is operating at a loss.

  • Metros choosing how to structure their trading services have three options: a business unit within the municipality, a municipal entity, or a concession. Mangaung chose the business unit model for water and sanitation because it already has an entity (Sandlac) for electricity. Work on solid waste is ongoing; initial analysis suggests the revenue size may point toward a different model.
  • The reform brings a structural standardisation benefit: water and sanitation must now be a separate vote at function level, rather than being clustered under technical and engineering services. This creates the financial visibility to understand the actual performance and cost base of each trading service.
  • Treasury's core belief is that trading service revenues are being cross-subsidised to fund other municipal operations, leaving maintenance and infrastructure investment underfunded and tariffs non-cost-reflective. Ring-fenced financial statements - including standalone cash flows - are required precisely because segment reporting does not reveal the full financial position and performance of each service.
  • Mangaung's standalone financial statements for water and sanitation confirmed the trading service is operating at a deficit. The city identified that 42% of purchased bulk water is lost as non-revenue water, and developed a 15-point plan to reduce those losses. Of 35,000 installed water meters, only 11,000 were actively vending - directly paralleling eThekwini's electricity metering gap.
  • Mangaung opened a separate bank account for water and sanitation to ring-fence grant funding for infrastructure projects, ensuring grants are not used for unintended purposes and creditors are paid on time. Splitting receipts across all trading services - including rates - at cashflow level has been technically challenging.
  • The reform is a six-year pilot for Cohort One metros (year zero was 2025/26). The grant has 47 binary indicators - each one must be met in full; a single "no" risks disqualifying the municipality from the reform program, potentially losing access to grant funding that was transferred from the previous USDG allocation. After 2032, these reforms may become regulated requirements for all municipalities.
  • Finance and operations must reinforce each other: operations must deliver the service that generates the revenue; finance must fund the operations that deliver the service. Cross-subsidisation to other parts of the municipality should only occur when the trading service is generating a surplus.

"For the first time, we understood that there are losses - and these losses are coming from the deficit in the income statement. If you put down a plan to reduce non-revenue water, you can change that money that goes into the drain and reinvest it into infrastructure."

Mr Enoch Ranga - Senior Manager: Revenue Consulting, Ntiyiso

Enoch focused on the authority and accountability dimensions of the reform - who owns a problem through the full revenue chain, and what happens when that ownership breaks down. He drew on Ntiyiso's direct experience across metros and municipalities to highlight data integrity failures that undermine the reform before it starts.

  • The revenue chain from meter to bank has multiple handoffs - meter reading, billing, collection, credit control - each of which can break down when no one person owns the full chain. A meter is replaced in the field, the asset register is not updated, an estimate is sent, the resident pays, credit control issues a notice anyway. Each step was correct in isolation; the system failed because no one owned the correction.
  • Data integrity must precede revenue recovery. Before Ntiyiso begins revenue consulting work with a municipality, its data cleansing team verifies that the amount claimed as owed is actually owed - and in many cases the verified debt book is half or less of what the system shows. Five billion on paper can become two billion after cleansing. Accountability for that gap is usually absent.
  • The choice between a business unit and a municipal entity determines where authority sits in a crisis. If a water main bursts on a Friday evening, someone must have the authority to deploy a crew - without calling the CFO or waiting for council approval. That delegated authority must be defined, written, and known to the duty manager before the crisis happens.
  • Shared services - HR, ICT, procurement, billing - must be governed by formal service-level agreements between the trading service and the corporate function that provides them. Without a signed SLA, shared costs end up sitting in one ring-fenced entity's financial statements while others appear artificially profitable. This distorts performance assessment and may direct reform incentives to the wrong entity.
  • Professional decisions must survive a change in leadership - which is especially pertinent in a post-election period. Councils must be kept out of bid committees. Utility management appointments must be competence-based. Written delegations and service compacts create institutional memory that persists through political transitions.
  • Three everyday handoffs define operational accountability: meter to bill, credit to field, dispute to remedy. For each handoff, there must be a named owner, a deadline, a quality check and an escalation route. When these are not in place, residents are passed between departments and no one is accountable for resolution.

"Give the utility manager authority to fix the service - and give council and residents the evidence to hold that manager to account."

Mr Daniel Nolte - Head of Capacitation and Development, Centre for Municipal Asset Management (CMAM)

Daniel reflected on the reform from an asset management perspective, raising the gap between compliance-driven reporting and the financial management discipline required to actually sustain infrastructure - and welcoming a new national qualification in municipal asset management.

  • Section 152 of the Constitution places socioeconomic development alongside basic service delivery as an objective of local government. Roads and stormwater - omitted from the current trading services reform - are as important to this objective as electricity and water, and should be included in the reform thinking at metro level.
  • The new council cycle is a window: IDP regulations require a full IDP review with the onset of a new council. This creates an opportunity for metros to do a genuine recalibration of their service delivery and costing approach while political and institutional attention is fresh.
  • Section 19 of the MFMA has required full lifecycle costing for capital projects since 2003 - including the cost of running the asset over its entire lifespan and an assessment of the tariff impact - but most municipalities have not applied it. The result is decades of under-recovery, deferred maintenance, and the technical losses now being exposed by financial modeling.
  • The sector has focused on audit compliance and accuracy in reporting - for example, impairment calculations - without addressing why impairment occurs. Assets are impaired because maintenance was deferred. That deferral is a cost of service delivery that is being treated as an accounting outcome rather than a management failure.
  • In May 2026, the QCTO approved a formal qualification for municipal asset managers - the first time the profession has been recognised as a distinct field of study. CMAM is working with LG SETA, SALGA and the National School of Government to develop training materials. Getting the right people into asset management roles is as important as reforming the institutional structure.
  • A satisfied consumer pays gladly. If services are delivered efficiently and economically, revenue collection follows. The reform's financial logic depends on this: reliable services that customers value are the foundation of a sustainable revenue base, not the other way around.

"We are very set on compliance - making the auditors happy - but that is only really on the reporting side. Sometimes we lose the financial management aspect: we calculate impairment accurately without looking at why we are impairing assets. It is because we did not spend the money to maintain them."


Key takeaways for practitioners

  1. The metro trading services reform is currently a pilot for eight metros, but National Treasury may regulate it for all municipalities after 2032. Officials and councillors at district and local level should read the reform documentation on govmuni under the City Support Program now - not when the regulation arrives.
  2. Standalone financial statements for each trading service, including cash flow statements, are not a reporting burden - they are a diagnostic tool. For the first time, Mangaung and eThekwini could see that their trading services were operating at a loss and quantify the size of the gap. Segment reporting in consolidated statements does not provide this visibility.
  3. A single point of management accountability is the structural prerequisite for everything else. Without one person who owns the full chain - technical operations, billing, collection, maintenance, customer service - accountability disperses and no reform intervention will hold.
  4. Revenue recovery does not require building new infrastructure. At eThekwini, nearly R3 billion in recoverable revenue sits in energy already purchased but not billed. The first lever is fixing what is already broken: inactive prepaid meters, inaccurate billing for commercial customers, unbilled municipal usage. These are operational discipline problems, not capital investment problems.
  5. Shared services must be governed by signed service-level agreements before ring-fenced financial reporting begins. Without them, costs accumulate in one entity's statements and others appear artificially profitable, distorting reform incentives and performance assessment.
  6. New councils arriving after the elections inherit an institutional reform in progress. Councillors must understand their constitutional role as service authority - approving policy, tariffs and budgets, and questioning service results. Governance must stay clearly separated from management. The service compact is the instrument that defines this boundary.
  7. Water losses are the most urgent infrastructure priority. Without electricity, alternatives exist. Without water, there are none. Non-revenue water at 42% in Mangaung and over 50% at peak in eThekwini represents hundreds of millions of rand in purchased bulk water lost before it reaches a customer - and it represents a direct threat to communities that the reform must address.

CPD points available - contact cpd@cigfaro.co.za

Series partners: CIGFARO - SALGA - Centre for Municipal Asset Management - Institute for Local Government Management - IMPSA